/* * TLS 1.3 key schedule * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 ( the "License" ); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) #include "mbedtls/hkdf.h" #include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h" #include "ssl_tls13_keys.h" #include #include #define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( name, string ) \ .name = string, struct mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels_struct const mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels = { /* This seems to work in C, despite the string literal being one * character too long due to the 0-termination. */ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL_LIST }; #undef MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL /* * This function creates a HkdfLabel structure used in the TLS 1.3 key schedule. * * The HkdfLabel is specified in RFC 8446 as follows: * * struct HkdfLabel { * uint16 length; // Length of expanded key material * opaque label<7..255>; // Always prefixed by "tls13 " * opaque context<0..255>; // Usually a communication transcript hash * }; * * Parameters: * - desired_length: Length of expanded key material * Even though the standard allows expansion to up to * 2**16 Bytes, TLS 1.3 never uses expansion to more than * 255 Bytes, so we require `desired_length` to be at most * 255. This allows us to save a few Bytes of code by * hardcoding the writing of the high bytes. * - (label, llen): label + label length, without "tls13 " prefix * The label length MUST be less than or equal to * MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_LABEL_LEN * It is the caller's responsibility to ensure this. * All (label, label length) pairs used in TLS 1.3 * can be obtained via MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(). * - (ctx, clen): context + context length * The context length MUST be less than or equal to * MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_CONTEXT_LEN * It is the caller's responsibility to ensure this. * - dst: Target buffer for HkdfLabel structure, * This MUST be a writable buffer of size * at least SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_HKDF_LABEL_LEN Bytes. * - dlen: Pointer at which to store the actual length of * the HkdfLabel structure on success. */ static const char tls1_3_label_prefix[6] = "tls13 "; #define SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_HKDF_LABEL_LEN( label_len, context_len ) \ ( 2 /* expansion length */ \ + 1 /* label length */ \ + label_len \ + 1 /* context length */ \ + context_len ) #define SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_HKDF_LABEL_LEN \ SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_HKDF_LABEL_LEN( \ sizeof(tls1_3_label_prefix) + \ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_LABEL_LEN, \ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_CONTEXT_LEN ) static void ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_encode_label( size_t desired_length, const unsigned char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *ctx, size_t clen, unsigned char *dst, size_t *dlen ) { size_t total_label_len = sizeof(tls1_3_label_prefix) + llen; size_t total_hkdf_lbl_len = SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_HKDF_LABEL_LEN( total_label_len, clen ); unsigned char *p = dst; /* Add the size of the expanded key material. * We're hardcoding the high byte to 0 here assuming that we never use * TLS 1.3 HKDF key expansion to more than 255 Bytes. */ #if MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_EXPANSION_LEN > 255 #error "The implementation of ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_encode_label() is not fit for the \ value of MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_EXPANSION_LEN" #endif *p++ = 0; *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( desired_length ); /* Add label incl. prefix */ *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( total_label_len ); memcpy( p, tls1_3_label_prefix, sizeof(tls1_3_label_prefix) ); p += sizeof(tls1_3_label_prefix); memcpy( p, label, llen ); p += llen; /* Add context value */ *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( clen ); if( clen != 0 ) memcpy( p, ctx, clen ); /* Return total length to the caller. */ *dlen = total_hkdf_lbl_len; } int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label( mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg, const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, const unsigned char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *ctx, size_t clen, unsigned char *buf, size_t blen ) { const mbedtls_md_info_t *md; unsigned char hkdf_label[ SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_HKDF_LABEL_LEN ]; size_t hkdf_label_len; if( llen > MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_LABEL_LEN ) { /* Should never happen since this is an internal * function, and we know statically which labels * are allowed. */ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); } if( clen > MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_CONTEXT_LEN ) { /* Should not happen, as above. */ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); } if( blen > MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_EXPANSION_LEN ) { /* Should not happen, as above. */ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); } md = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( hash_alg ); if( md == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_encode_label( blen, label, llen, ctx, clen, hkdf_label, &hkdf_label_len ); return( mbedtls_hkdf_expand( md, secret, slen, hkdf_label, hkdf_label_len, buf, blen ) ); } /* * The traffic keying material is generated from the following inputs: * * - One secret value per sender. * - A purpose value indicating the specific value being generated * - The desired lengths of key and IV. * * The expansion itself is based on HKDF: * * [sender]_write_key = HKDF-Expand-Label( Secret, "key", "", key_length ) * [sender]_write_iv = HKDF-Expand-Label( Secret, "iv" , "", iv_length ) * * [sender] denotes the sending side and the Secret value is provided * by the function caller. Note that we generate server and client side * keys in a single function call. */ int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_make_traffic_keys( mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg, const unsigned char *client_secret, const unsigned char *server_secret, size_t slen, size_t key_len, size_t iv_len, mbedtls_ssl_key_set *keys ) { int ret = 0; ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label( hash_alg, client_secret, slen, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN( key ), NULL, 0, keys->client_write_key, key_len ); if( ret != 0 ) return( ret ); ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label( hash_alg, server_secret, slen, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN( key ), NULL, 0, keys->server_write_key, key_len ); if( ret != 0 ) return( ret ); ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label( hash_alg, client_secret, slen, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN( iv ), NULL, 0, keys->client_write_iv, iv_len ); if( ret != 0 ) return( ret ); ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label( hash_alg, server_secret, slen, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN( iv ), NULL, 0, keys->server_write_iv, iv_len ); if( ret != 0 ) return( ret ); keys->key_len = key_len; keys->iv_len = iv_len; return( 0 ); } int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_derive_secret( mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg, const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, const unsigned char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *ctx, size_t clen, int ctx_hashed, unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t buflen ) { int ret; unsigned char hashed_context[ MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE ]; const mbedtls_md_info_t *md; md = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( hash_alg ); if( md == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); if( ctx_hashed == MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_UNHASHED ) { ret = mbedtls_md( md, ctx, clen, hashed_context ); if( ret != 0 ) return( ret ); clen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md ); } else { if( clen > sizeof(hashed_context) ) { /* This should never happen since this function is internal * and the code sets `ctx_hashed` correctly. * Let's double-check nonetheless to not run at the risk * of getting a stack overflow. */ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); } memcpy( hashed_context, ctx, clen ); } return( mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label( hash_alg, secret, slen, label, llen, hashed_context, clen, dstbuf, buflen ) ); } int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_evolve_secret( mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg, const unsigned char *secret_old, const unsigned char *input, size_t input_len, unsigned char *secret_new ) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; size_t hlen, ilen; unsigned char tmp_secret[ MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE ] = { 0 }; unsigned char tmp_input [ MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE ] = { 0 }; const mbedtls_md_info_t *md; md = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( hash_alg ); if( md == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md ); /* For non-initial runs, call Derive-Secret( ., "derived", "") * on the old secret. */ if( secret_old != NULL ) { ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_derive_secret( hash_alg, secret_old, hlen, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN( derived ), NULL, 0, /* context */ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_UNHASHED, tmp_secret, hlen ); if( ret != 0 ) goto cleanup; } if( input != NULL ) { memcpy( tmp_input, input, input_len ); ilen = input_len; } else { ilen = hlen; } /* HKDF-Extract takes a salt and input key material. * The salt is the old secret, and the input key material * is the input secret (PSK / ECDHE). */ ret = mbedtls_hkdf_extract( md, tmp_secret, hlen, tmp_input, ilen, secret_new ); if( ret != 0 ) goto cleanup; ret = 0; cleanup: mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp_secret, sizeof(tmp_secret) ); mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp_input, sizeof(tmp_input) ); return( ret ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */