| /optee_os-3.20.0/core/drivers/crypto/versal/ |
| A D | rsa.c | 226 p->signature.data, in do_ssa_sign()
227 &p->signature.length); in do_ssa_sign()
235 p->signature.data, in do_ssa_sign()
236 &p->signature.length); in do_ssa_sign()
247 p->signature.data, in do_ssa_sign()
248 &p->signature.length); in do_ssa_sign()
273 p->signature.data, in do_ssa_verify()
274 p->signature.length); in do_ssa_verify()
282 p->signature.data, in do_ssa_verify()
283 p->signature.length); in do_ssa_verify()
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| A D | ecc.c | 354 sdata->signature.data, in do_sign()
355 &sdata->signature.length); in do_sign()
364 sdata->signature.data, in do_verify()
365 sdata->signature.length); in do_verify()
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| /optee_os-3.20.0/core/drivers/crypto/crypto_api/acipher/ |
| A D | dsa.c | 164 sdata.signature.data = sig; in crypto_acipher_dsa_sign()
165 sdata.signature.length = *sig_len; in crypto_acipher_dsa_sign()
170 *sig_len = sdata.signature.length; in crypto_acipher_dsa_sign()
218 sdata.signature.data = (uint8_t *)sig; in crypto_acipher_dsa_verify()
219 sdata.signature.length = sig_len; in crypto_acipher_dsa_verify()
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| A D | ecc.c | 199 sdata.signature.data = (uint8_t *)sig; in ecc_sign()
200 sdata.signature.length = *sig_len; in ecc_sign()
205 *sig_len = sdata.signature.length; in ecc_sign()
262 sdata.signature.data = (uint8_t *)sig; in ecc_verify()
263 sdata.signature.length = sig_len; in ecc_verify()
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| A D | rsassa.c | 215 rsa_data.message.data = ssa_data->signature.data; in rsassa_pkcs1_v1_5_sign()
216 rsa_data.message.length = ssa_data->signature.length; in rsassa_pkcs1_v1_5_sign()
225 ssa_data->signature.length = rsa_data.message.length; in rsassa_pkcs1_v1_5_sign()
270 rsa_data.message.data = ssa_data->signature.data; in rsassa_pkcs1_v1_5_verify()
271 rsa_data.message.length = ssa_data->signature.length; in rsassa_pkcs1_v1_5_verify()
775 rsa_data.message.data = ssa_data->signature.data; in rsassa_pss_sign()
776 rsa_data.message.length = ssa_data->signature.length; in rsassa_pss_sign()
784 ssa_data->signature.length = rsa_data.message.length; in rsassa_pss_sign()
845 rsa_data.message.data = ssa_data->signature.data; in rsassa_pss_verify()
846 rsa_data.message.length = ssa_data->signature.length; in rsassa_pss_verify()
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| A D | rsa.c | 404 rsa_ssa.signature.data = (uint8_t *)sig; in crypto_acipher_rsassa_sign()
405 rsa_ssa.signature.length = rsa_ssa.key.n_size; in crypto_acipher_rsassa_sign()
417 *sig_len = rsa_ssa.signature.length; in crypto_acipher_rsassa_sign()
482 rsa_ssa.signature.data = (uint8_t *)sig; in crypto_acipher_rsassa_verify()
483 rsa_ssa.signature.length = sig_len; in crypto_acipher_rsassa_verify()
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| /optee_os-3.20.0/core/drivers/crypto/se050/core/ |
| A D | ecc.c | 595 uint8_t signature[128]; in verify() local
596 size_t signature_len = sizeof(signature); in verify()
626 st = sss_se05x_signature_bin2der(signature, &signature_len, in verify()
634 msg_len, (uint8_t *)signature, in verify()
729 sdata->signature.data, in do_sign()
730 &sdata->signature.length); in do_sign()
739 sdata->signature.data, in do_verify()
740 sdata->signature.length); in do_verify()
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| A D | rsa.c | 832 p->signature.data, in sign_ssa_fallback()
833 &p->signature.length); in sign_ssa_fallback()
866 ssa_data->signature.data, in do_ssa_sign()
867 &ssa_data->signature.length); in do_ssa_sign()
881 p->signature.data, in verify_ssa_fallback()
882 p->signature.length); in verify_ssa_fallback()
912 ssa_data->signature.data, in do_ssa_verify()
913 ssa_data->signature.length); in do_ssa_verify()
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| /optee_os-3.20.0/core/drivers/crypto/crypto_api/include/ |
| A D | drvcrypt_acipher.h | 52 struct drvcrypt_buf signature; /* Signature of the message */ member
123 struct drvcrypt_buf signature; /* Signature of the message */ member
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| /optee_os-3.20.0/core/drivers/crypto/caam/acipher/ |
| A D | caam_ecc.c | 388 ret = caam_dmaobj_output_sgtbuf(&sign_c, sdata->signature.data, in do_sign()
389 sdata->signature.length, sign_len); in do_sign()
435 sdata->signature.length = caam_dmaobj_copy_to_orig(&sign_c); in do_sign()
437 ECC_DUMPBUF("Signature", sdata->signature.data, in do_sign()
438 sdata->signature.length); in do_sign()
515 ret = caam_dmaobj_input_sgtbuf(&sign_c, sdata->signature.data, in do_verify()
516 sdata->signature.length); in do_verify()
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| A D | caam_dsa.c | 539 ret = caam_dmaobj_output_sgtbuf(&sign_c, sdata->signature.data, in do_sign()
540 sdata->signature.length, sign_len); in do_sign()
595 sdata->signature.length = caam_dmaobj_copy_to_orig(&sign_c); in do_sign()
597 DSA_DUMPBUF("Signature", sdata->signature.data, in do_sign()
598 sdata->signature.length); in do_sign()
672 ret = caam_dmaobj_input_sgtbuf(&sign_c, sdata->signature.data, in do_verify()
673 sdata->signature.length); in do_verify()
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| /optee_os-3.20.0/core/include/kernel/ |
| A D | tcg.h | 86 uint8_t signature[16]; member
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| /optee_os-3.20.0/core/drivers/bnxt/ |
| A D | bnxt_fw.c | 119 uint32_t signature; member
188 uint32_t signature; member
274 if (hdr->signature != APE_BIN_HDR_SIGNATURE) { in ape_bin_hdr_valid()
601 info->signature = BNXT_CRASH_INFO_SIGNATURE; in bnxt_crash_config()
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| /optee_os-3.20.0/lib/libutee/include/ |
| A D | tee_internal_api.h | 313 uint32_t digestLen, void *signature,
319 uint32_t digestLen, const void *signature,
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| /optee_os-3.20.0/core/kernel/ |
| A D | tcg.c | 135 if (memcmp(spec_event->signature, TCG_EFI_SPEC_ID_EVENT_SIGNATURE_03, in tcg_parse_specid_event()
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| /optee_os-3.20.0/lib/libutee/ |
| A D | tee_api_operations.c | 1713 uint32_t digestLen, void *signature, in TEE_AsymmetricSignDigest() argument
1737 digestLen, signature, &sl); in TEE_AsymmetricSignDigest()
1750 const void *signature, in TEE_AsymmetricVerifyDigest() argument
1758 (signature == NULL && signatureLen != 0)) in TEE_AsymmetricVerifyDigest()
1773 digestLen, signature, signatureLen); in TEE_AsymmetricVerifyDigest()
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| /optee_os-3.20.0/lib/libmbedtls/mbedtls/ |
| A D | ChangeLog | 244 signature with a specific salt length. This function allows to validate
265 signature, allowing the recovery of the private key after observing a
266 large number of signature operations. This completes a partial fix in
605 description part of the cert to the real signature. This meant that a
989 * Fix potential memory overread when performing an ECDSA signature
1329 due to an unacceptable hash signature. The certificate has been
1899 where an optional signature algorithms list is expected when the signature
2209 * Parse signature algorithm extension when renegotiating. Previously,
2391 * Fix insufficient support for signature-hash-algorithm extension,
4341 * X509 signature algorithm determination is now
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