1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
2 /* Verify the signature on a PKCS#7 message.
3 *
4 * Imported from crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c of linux 5.7
5 * with modification marked as __UBOOT__.
6 *
7 * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
8 * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
9 */
10
11 #define pr_fmt(fmt) "PKCS7: "fmt
12 #ifdef __UBOOT__
13 #include <image.h>
14 #include <string.h>
15 #include <linux/bitops.h>
16 #include <linux/compat.h>
17 #include <linux/asn1.h>
18 #include <linux/printk.h>
19 #include <u-boot/hash-checksum.h>
20 #include <crypto/public_key.h>
21 #include <crypto/pkcs7_parser.h>
22 #else
23 #include <linux/kernel.h>
24 #include <linux/export.h>
25 #include <linux/slab.h>
26 #include <linux/err.h>
27 #include <linux/asn1.h>
28 #include <crypto/hash.h>
29 #include <crypto/hash_info.h>
30 #include <crypto/public_key.h>
31 #include "pkcs7_parser.h"
32 #endif
33
34 /*
35 * pkcs7_digest - Digest the relevant parts of the PKCS#7 data
36 * @pkcs7: PKCS7 Signed Data
37 * @sinfo: PKCS7 Signed Info
38 *
39 * Digest the relevant parts of the PKCS#7 data, @pkcs7, using signature
40 * information in @sinfo. But if there are authentication attributes,
41 * i.e. signed image case, the digest must be calculated against
42 * the authentication attributes.
43 *
44 * Return: 0 - on success, non-zero error code - otherwise
45 */
46 #ifdef __UBOOT__
pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message * pkcs7,struct pkcs7_signed_info * sinfo)47 static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
48 struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo)
49 {
50 struct public_key_signature *sig = sinfo->sig;
51 struct image_region regions[2];
52 int ret = 0;
53
54 /*
55 * [RFC2315 9.3]
56 * If the authenticated attributes are present,
57 * the message-digest is calculated on the
58 * attributes present in the
59 * authenticatedAttributes field and not just
60 * the contents field
61 */
62 if (!sinfo->authattrs && sig->digest)
63 return 0;
64
65 if (!sinfo->sig->hash_algo)
66 return -ENOPKG;
67 if (!strcmp(sinfo->sig->hash_algo, "sha256"))
68 sig->digest_size = SHA256_SUM_LEN;
69 else if (!strcmp(sinfo->sig->hash_algo, "sha384"))
70 sig->digest_size = SHA384_SUM_LEN;
71 else if (!strcmp(sinfo->sig->hash_algo, "sha512"))
72 sig->digest_size = SHA512_SUM_LEN;
73 else if (!strcmp(sinfo->sig->hash_algo, "sha1"))
74 sig->digest_size = SHA1_SUM_LEN;
75 else
76 return -ENOPKG;
77
78 /*
79 * Calculate the hash only if the data is present.
80 * In case of authenticated variable and capsule,
81 * the hash has already been calculated on the
82 * efi_image_regions and populated
83 */
84 if (pkcs7->data) {
85 sig->digest = calloc(1, sig->digest_size);
86 if (!sig->digest) {
87 pr_warn("Sig %u: Out of memory\n", sinfo->index);
88 return -ENOMEM;
89 }
90
91 regions[0].data = pkcs7->data;
92 regions[0].size = pkcs7->data_len;
93
94 /* Digest the message [RFC2315 9.3] */
95 hash_calculate(sinfo->sig->hash_algo, regions, 1, sig->digest);
96 }
97
98 /* However, if there are authenticated attributes, there must be a
99 * message digest attribute amongst them which corresponds to the
100 * digest we just calculated.
101 */
102 if (sinfo->authattrs) {
103 u8 tag;
104
105 if (!sinfo->msgdigest) {
106 pr_warn("Sig %u: No messageDigest\n", sinfo->index);
107 ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
108 goto error;
109 }
110
111 if (sinfo->msgdigest_len != sig->digest_size) {
112 pr_debug("Sig %u: Invalid digest size (%u)\n",
113 sinfo->index, sinfo->msgdigest_len);
114 ret = -EBADMSG;
115 goto error;
116 }
117
118 if (memcmp(sig->digest, sinfo->msgdigest,
119 sinfo->msgdigest_len) != 0) {
120 pr_debug("Sig %u: Message digest doesn't match\n",
121 sinfo->index);
122 ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
123 goto error;
124 }
125
126 /* We then calculate anew, using the authenticated attributes
127 * as the contents of the digest instead. Note that we need to
128 * convert the attributes from a CONT.0 into a SET before we
129 * hash it.
130 */
131 memset(sig->digest, 0, sig->digest_size);
132
133 tag = 0x31;
134 regions[0].data = &tag;
135 regions[0].size = 1;
136 regions[1].data = sinfo->authattrs;
137 regions[1].size = sinfo->authattrs_len;
138
139 hash_calculate(sinfo->sig->hash_algo, regions, 2, sig->digest);
140
141 ret = 0;
142 }
143 error:
144 return ret;
145 }
146 #else /* !__UBOOT__ */
pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message * pkcs7,struct pkcs7_signed_info * sinfo)147 static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
148 struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo)
149 {
150 struct public_key_signature *sig = sinfo->sig;
151 struct crypto_shash *tfm;
152 struct shash_desc *desc;
153 size_t desc_size;
154 int ret;
155
156 kenter(",%u,%s", sinfo->index, sinfo->sig->hash_algo);
157
158 /* The digest was calculated already. */
159 if (sig->digest)
160 return 0;
161
162 if (!sinfo->sig->hash_algo)
163 return -ENOPKG;
164
165 /* Allocate the hashing algorithm we're going to need and find out how
166 * big the hash operational data will be.
167 */
168 tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(sinfo->sig->hash_algo, 0, 0);
169 if (IS_ERR(tfm))
170 return (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) ? -ENOPKG : PTR_ERR(tfm);
171
172 desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc);
173 sig->digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
174
175 ret = -ENOMEM;
176 sig->digest = kmalloc(sig->digest_size, GFP_KERNEL);
177 if (!sig->digest)
178 goto error_no_desc;
179
180 desc = kzalloc(desc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
181 if (!desc)
182 goto error_no_desc;
183
184 desc->tfm = tfm;
185
186 /* Digest the message [RFC2315 9.3] */
187 ret = crypto_shash_digest(desc, pkcs7->data, pkcs7->data_len,
188 sig->digest);
189 if (ret < 0)
190 goto error;
191 pr_devel("MsgDigest = [%*ph]\n", 8, sig->digest);
192
193 /* However, if there are authenticated attributes, there must be a
194 * message digest attribute amongst them which corresponds to the
195 * digest we just calculated.
196 */
197 if (sinfo->authattrs) {
198 u8 tag;
199
200 if (!sinfo->msgdigest) {
201 pr_warn("Sig %u: No messageDigest\n", sinfo->index);
202 ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
203 goto error;
204 }
205
206 if (sinfo->msgdigest_len != sig->digest_size) {
207 pr_debug("Sig %u: Invalid digest size (%u)\n",
208 sinfo->index, sinfo->msgdigest_len);
209 ret = -EBADMSG;
210 goto error;
211 }
212
213 if (memcmp(sig->digest, sinfo->msgdigest,
214 sinfo->msgdigest_len) != 0) {
215 pr_debug("Sig %u: Message digest doesn't match\n",
216 sinfo->index);
217 ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
218 goto error;
219 }
220
221 /* We then calculate anew, using the authenticated attributes
222 * as the contents of the digest instead. Note that we need to
223 * convert the attributes from a CONT.0 into a SET before we
224 * hash it.
225 */
226 memset(sig->digest, 0, sig->digest_size);
227
228 ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
229 if (ret < 0)
230 goto error;
231 tag = ASN1_CONS_BIT | ASN1_SET;
232 ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, &tag, 1);
233 if (ret < 0)
234 goto error;
235 ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, sinfo->authattrs,
236 sinfo->authattrs_len, sig->digest);
237 if (ret < 0)
238 goto error;
239 pr_devel("AADigest = [%*ph]\n", 8, sig->digest);
240 }
241
242 error:
243 kfree(desc);
244 error_no_desc:
245 crypto_free_shash(tfm);
246 kleave(" = %d", ret);
247 return ret;
248 }
249
pkcs7_get_digest(struct pkcs7_message * pkcs7,const u8 ** buf,u32 * len,enum hash_algo * hash_algo)250 int pkcs7_get_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, const u8 **buf, u32 *len,
251 enum hash_algo *hash_algo)
252 {
253 struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos;
254 int i, ret;
255
256 /*
257 * This function doesn't support messages with more than one signature.
258 */
259 if (sinfo == NULL || sinfo->next != NULL)
260 return -EBADMSG;
261
262 ret = pkcs7_digest(pkcs7, sinfo);
263 if (ret)
264 return ret;
265
266 *buf = sinfo->sig->digest;
267 *len = sinfo->sig->digest_size;
268
269 for (i = 0; i < HASH_ALGO__LAST; i++)
270 if (!strcmp(hash_algo_name[i], sinfo->sig->hash_algo)) {
271 *hash_algo = i;
272 break;
273 }
274
275 return 0;
276 }
277 #endif /* !__UBOOT__ */
278
279 /*
280 * Find the key (X.509 certificate) to use to verify a PKCS#7 message. PKCS#7
281 * uses the issuer's name and the issuing certificate serial number for
282 * matching purposes. These must match the certificate issuer's name (not
283 * subject's name) and the certificate serial number [RFC 2315 6.7].
284 */
pkcs7_find_key(struct pkcs7_message * pkcs7,struct pkcs7_signed_info * sinfo)285 static int pkcs7_find_key(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
286 struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo)
287 {
288 struct x509_certificate *x509;
289 unsigned certix = 1;
290
291 kenter("%u", sinfo->index);
292
293 for (x509 = pkcs7->certs; x509; x509 = x509->next, certix++) {
294 /* I'm _assuming_ that the generator of the PKCS#7 message will
295 * encode the fields from the X.509 cert in the same way in the
296 * PKCS#7 message - but I can't be 100% sure of that. It's
297 * possible this will need element-by-element comparison.
298 */
299 if (!asymmetric_key_id_same(x509->id, sinfo->sig->auth_ids[0]))
300 continue;
301 pr_devel("Sig %u: Found cert serial match X.509[%u]\n",
302 sinfo->index, certix);
303
304 if (strcmp(x509->pub->pkey_algo, sinfo->sig->pkey_algo) != 0) {
305 pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 algo and PKCS#7 sig algo don't match\n",
306 sinfo->index);
307 continue;
308 }
309
310 sinfo->signer = x509;
311 return 0;
312 }
313
314 /* The relevant X.509 cert isn't found here, but it might be found in
315 * the trust keyring.
316 */
317 pr_debug("Sig %u: Issuing X.509 cert not found (#%*phN)\n",
318 sinfo->index,
319 sinfo->sig->auth_ids[0]->len, sinfo->sig->auth_ids[0]->data);
320 return 0;
321 }
322
323 /*
324 * pkcs7_verify_sig_chain - Verify the internal certificate chain as best
325 * as we can.
326 * @pkcs7: PKCS7 Signed Data
327 * @sinfo: PKCS7 Signed Info
328 * @signer: Singer's certificate
329 *
330 * Build up and verify the internal certificate chain against a signature
331 * in @sinfo, using certificates contained in @pkcs7 as best as we can.
332 * If the chain reaches the end, the last certificate will be returned
333 * in @signer.
334 *
335 * Return: 0 - on success, non-zero error code - otherwise
336 */
337 #ifdef __UBOOT__
pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message * pkcs7,struct pkcs7_signed_info * sinfo,struct x509_certificate ** signer)338 static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
339 struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo,
340 struct x509_certificate **signer)
341 #else
342 static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
343 struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo)
344 #endif
345 {
346 struct public_key_signature *sig;
347 struct x509_certificate *x509 = sinfo->signer, *p;
348 struct asymmetric_key_id *auth;
349 int ret;
350
351 kenter("");
352
353 *signer = NULL;
354
355 for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next)
356 p->seen = false;
357
358 for (;;) {
359 pr_debug("verify %s: %*phN\n",
360 x509->subject,
361 x509->raw_serial_size, x509->raw_serial);
362 x509->seen = true;
363
364 if (x509->blacklisted) {
365 /* If this cert is blacklisted, then mark everything
366 * that depends on this as blacklisted too.
367 */
368 sinfo->blacklisted = true;
369 for (p = sinfo->signer; p != x509; p = p->signer)
370 p->blacklisted = true;
371 pr_debug("- blacklisted\n");
372 #ifdef __UBOOT__
373 *signer = x509;
374 #endif
375 return 0;
376 }
377
378 if (x509->unsupported_key)
379 goto unsupported_crypto_in_x509;
380
381 pr_debug("- issuer %s\n", x509->issuer);
382 sig = x509->sig;
383 if (sig->auth_ids[0])
384 pr_debug("- authkeyid.id %*phN\n",
385 sig->auth_ids[0]->len, sig->auth_ids[0]->data);
386 if (sig->auth_ids[1])
387 pr_debug("- authkeyid.skid %*phN\n",
388 sig->auth_ids[1]->len, sig->auth_ids[1]->data);
389
390 if (x509->self_signed) {
391 /* If there's no authority certificate specified, then
392 * the certificate must be self-signed and is the root
393 * of the chain. Likewise if the cert is its own
394 * authority.
395 */
396 if (x509->unsupported_sig)
397 goto unsupported_crypto_in_x509;
398 x509->signer = x509;
399 pr_debug("- self-signed\n");
400 #ifdef __UBOOT__
401 *signer = x509;
402 #endif
403 return 0;
404 }
405
406 /* Look through the X.509 certificates in the PKCS#7 message's
407 * list to see if the next one is there.
408 */
409 auth = sig->auth_ids[0];
410 if (auth) {
411 pr_debug("- want %*phN\n", auth->len, auth->data);
412 for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next) {
413 pr_debug("- cmp [%u] %*phN\n",
414 p->index, p->id->len, p->id->data);
415 if (asymmetric_key_id_same(p->id, auth))
416 goto found_issuer_check_skid;
417 }
418 } else if (sig->auth_ids[1]) {
419 auth = sig->auth_ids[1];
420 pr_debug("- want %*phN\n", auth->len, auth->data);
421 for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next) {
422 if (!p->skid)
423 continue;
424 pr_debug("- cmp [%u] %*phN\n",
425 p->index, p->skid->len, p->skid->data);
426 if (asymmetric_key_id_same(p->skid, auth))
427 goto found_issuer;
428 }
429 }
430
431 /* We didn't find the root of this chain */
432 pr_debug("- top\n");
433 #ifdef __UBOOT__
434 *signer = x509;
435 #endif
436 return 0;
437
438 found_issuer_check_skid:
439 /* We matched issuer + serialNumber, but if there's an
440 * authKeyId.keyId, that must match the CA subjKeyId also.
441 */
442 if (sig->auth_ids[1] &&
443 !asymmetric_key_id_same(p->skid, sig->auth_ids[1])) {
444 pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 chain contains auth-skid nonmatch (%u->%u)\n",
445 sinfo->index, x509->index, p->index);
446 return -EKEYREJECTED;
447 }
448 found_issuer:
449 pr_debug("- subject %s\n", p->subject);
450 if (p->seen) {
451 pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 chain contains loop\n",
452 sinfo->index);
453 #ifdef __UBOOT__
454 *signer = p;
455 #endif
456 return 0;
457 }
458 ret = public_key_verify_signature(p->pub, x509->sig);
459 if (ret < 0)
460 return ret;
461 x509->signer = p;
462 if (x509 == p) {
463 pr_debug("- self-signed\n");
464 #ifdef __UBOOT__
465 *signer = p;
466 #endif
467 return 0;
468 }
469 x509 = p;
470 #ifndef __UBOOT__
471 might_sleep();
472 #endif
473 }
474
475 unsupported_crypto_in_x509:
476 /* Just prune the certificate chain at this point if we lack some
477 * crypto module to go further. Note, however, we don't want to set
478 * sinfo->unsupported_crypto as the signed info block may still be
479 * validatable against an X.509 cert lower in the chain that we have a
480 * trusted copy of.
481 */
482 return 0;
483 }
484
485 /*
486 * pkcs7_verify_one - Verify one signed information block from a PKCS#7
487 * message.
488 * @pkcs7: PKCS7 Signed Data
489 * @sinfo: PKCS7 Signed Info
490 * @signer: Signer's certificate
491 *
492 * Verify one signature in @sinfo and follow the certificate chain.
493 * If the chain reaches the end, the last certificate will be returned
494 * in @signer.
495 *
496 * Return: 0 - on success, non-zero error code - otherwise
497 */
498 #ifdef __UBOOT__
pkcs7_verify_one(struct pkcs7_message * pkcs7,struct pkcs7_signed_info * sinfo,struct x509_certificate ** signer)499 int pkcs7_verify_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
500 struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo,
501 struct x509_certificate **signer)
502 #else
503 static int pkcs7_verify_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
504 struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo)
505 #endif
506 {
507 int ret;
508
509 kenter(",%u", sinfo->index);
510
511 /* First of all, digest the data in the PKCS#7 message and the
512 * signed information block
513 */
514 ret = pkcs7_digest(pkcs7, sinfo);
515 if (ret < 0)
516 return ret;
517
518 /* Find the key for the signature if there is one */
519 ret = pkcs7_find_key(pkcs7, sinfo);
520 if (ret < 0)
521 return ret;
522
523 if (!sinfo->signer)
524 return 0;
525
526 pr_devel("Using X.509[%u] for sig %u\n",
527 sinfo->signer->index, sinfo->index);
528
529 /* Check that the PKCS#7 signing time is valid according to the X.509
530 * certificate. We can't, however, check against the system clock
531 * since that may not have been set yet and may be wrong.
532 */
533 if (test_bit(sinfo_has_signing_time, &sinfo->aa_set)) {
534 if (sinfo->signing_time < sinfo->signer->valid_from ||
535 sinfo->signing_time > sinfo->signer->valid_to) {
536 pr_warn("Message signed outside of X.509 validity window\n");
537 return -EKEYREJECTED;
538 }
539 }
540
541 /* Verify the PKCS#7 binary against the key */
542 ret = public_key_verify_signature(sinfo->signer->pub, sinfo->sig);
543 if (ret < 0)
544 return ret;
545
546 pr_devel("Verified signature %u\n", sinfo->index);
547
548 /* Verify the internal certificate chain */
549 return pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(pkcs7, sinfo, signer);
550 }
551
552 #ifndef __UBOOT__
553 /**
554 * pkcs7_verify - Verify a PKCS#7 message
555 * @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message to be verified
556 * @usage: The use to which the key is being put
557 *
558 * Verify a PKCS#7 message is internally consistent - that is, the data digest
559 * matches the digest in the AuthAttrs and any signature in the message or one
560 * of the X.509 certificates it carries that matches another X.509 cert in the
561 * message can be verified.
562 *
563 * This does not look to match the contents of the PKCS#7 message against any
564 * external public keys.
565 *
566 * Returns, in order of descending priority:
567 *
568 * (*) -EKEYREJECTED if a key was selected that had a usage restriction at
569 * odds with the specified usage, or:
570 *
571 * (*) -EKEYREJECTED if a signature failed to match for which we found an
572 * appropriate X.509 certificate, or:
573 *
574 * (*) -EBADMSG if some part of the message was invalid, or:
575 *
576 * (*) 0 if a signature chain passed verification, or:
577 *
578 * (*) -EKEYREJECTED if a blacklisted key was encountered, or:
579 *
580 * (*) -ENOPKG if none of the signature chains are verifiable because suitable
581 * crypto modules couldn't be found.
582 */
pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message * pkcs7,enum key_being_used_for usage)583 int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
584 enum key_being_used_for usage)
585 {
586 struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo;
587 int actual_ret = -ENOPKG;
588 int ret;
589
590 kenter("");
591
592 switch (usage) {
593 case VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE:
594 if (pkcs7->data_type != OID_data) {
595 pr_warn("Invalid module sig (not pkcs7-data)\n");
596 return -EKEYREJECTED;
597 }
598 if (pkcs7->have_authattrs) {
599 pr_warn("Invalid module sig (has authattrs)\n");
600 return -EKEYREJECTED;
601 }
602 break;
603 case VERIFYING_FIRMWARE_SIGNATURE:
604 if (pkcs7->data_type != OID_data) {
605 pr_warn("Invalid firmware sig (not pkcs7-data)\n");
606 return -EKEYREJECTED;
607 }
608 if (!pkcs7->have_authattrs) {
609 pr_warn("Invalid firmware sig (missing authattrs)\n");
610 return -EKEYREJECTED;
611 }
612 break;
613 case VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE:
614 if (pkcs7->data_type != OID_msIndirectData) {
615 pr_warn("Invalid kexec sig (not Authenticode)\n");
616 return -EKEYREJECTED;
617 }
618 /* Authattr presence checked in parser */
619 break;
620 case VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE:
621 if (pkcs7->data_type != OID_data) {
622 pr_warn("Invalid unspecified sig (not pkcs7-data)\n");
623 return -EKEYREJECTED;
624 }
625 break;
626 default:
627 return -EINVAL;
628 }
629
630 for (sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos; sinfo; sinfo = sinfo->next) {
631 ret = pkcs7_verify_one(pkcs7, sinfo);
632 if (sinfo->blacklisted) {
633 if (actual_ret == -ENOPKG)
634 actual_ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
635 continue;
636 }
637 if (ret < 0) {
638 if (ret == -ENOPKG) {
639 sinfo->unsupported_crypto = true;
640 continue;
641 }
642 kleave(" = %d", ret);
643 return ret;
644 }
645 actual_ret = 0;
646 }
647
648 kleave(" = %d", actual_ret);
649 return actual_ret;
650 }
651 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_verify);
652
653 /**
654 * pkcs7_supply_detached_data - Supply the data needed to verify a PKCS#7 message
655 * @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message
656 * @data: The data to be verified
657 * @datalen: The amount of data
658 *
659 * Supply the detached data needed to verify a PKCS#7 message. Note that no
660 * attempt to retain/pin the data is made. That is left to the caller. The
661 * data will not be modified by pkcs7_verify() and will not be freed when the
662 * PKCS#7 message is freed.
663 *
664 * Returns -EINVAL if data is already supplied in the message, 0 otherwise.
665 */
pkcs7_supply_detached_data(struct pkcs7_message * pkcs7,const void * data,size_t datalen)666 int pkcs7_supply_detached_data(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
667 const void *data, size_t datalen)
668 {
669 if (pkcs7->data) {
670 pr_debug("Data already supplied\n");
671 return -EINVAL;
672 }
673 pkcs7->data = data;
674 pkcs7->data_len = datalen;
675 return 0;
676 }
677 #endif /* __UBOOT__ */
678